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INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
CLAUDIA MARTIN*

During the period covered by this report, the Inter-American Court on Human
Rights (hereinafter the 'Court') issued the following judgements on the merits: case of
Kimel vs Argentina, case of Salvador-Chiribogavs Ecuadorand case of Yvon Neptune
vs Haiti. Additionally, the Court adopted several decisions interpreting certain
aspects of previous judgements, pursuant to Article 67 of the American Convention
on Human Rights (hereinafter the 'American Convention' or 'Convention').
The present report will first briefly describe the Court's current procedure in
monitoring State compliance with its judgements. Second, it will analyse the Court's
judgement in the Kimel Case, on the issue of whether criminal defamation laws are
compatible with the American Convention. Third, the report will succinctly review
the facts and conclusions on the Neptune Case, the first judgement issued by the Court
against Haiti.
The full text of the decisions mentioned in this report can be found on the website
of the Court at www.corteidh.or.cr.

1.

MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT'S
JUDGEMENTS

Compliance with the Court's judgements is mandated under Articles 67 and 68 of
the American Convention. Article 67 provides that judgements of the Court are
final and not subject to appeal. Article 68 obligates States parties to comply with the
Court's judgements when the Convention is breached. Additionally, the Court holds
that judgement compliance is based on the pacta sunt servanda principle; whereby,
States must undertake its international obligations in good faith.' The Court further
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declared that the States' obligation to ensure effective domestic implementation of
the substantive and procedural provisions of the Convention includes compliance
with the Court's judgements. 2 Moreover, States that accept the Court's contentious
jurisdiction are obligated to respect its orders, including those requesting information
on the status of compliance with the Court's judgements. 3
The Court has no authority, under the American Convention or the Court's
Statute and Rules, to supervise compliance or set a monitoring procedure. However,
since the initial judgements on reparations in 1989, the tribunal established a practice
of requesting information from States and adopting resolutions assessing the State's
compliance. 4
In Baena Ricardo et al. vs Panama, the Court articulated the legal bases in
support of its practice of monitoring compliance. 5 In BaenaRicardo, the Panamanian
Government challenged the Court's authority to require information from States and
adopt resolutions on the status of compliance with its judgements. Panama argued
that the Court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction, because the OAS General
Assembly, pursuant to Article 65 of the American Convention, is the only organ
authorised to monitor States. The Court first reasserted its authority to determine
the scope of its own jurisdiction.6 Second, the Court reasoned that the surveillance
of judicial compliance is an inherent part of its jurisdiction.7 The Court's decisions
are not declaratory in nature, but aim to protect victim's rights and provide redress
for their violation; thus, decisions are effective only when fully executed.8 Last, the
Court concluded that the power to supervise compliance with its judgements is based
on an interpretation of several provisions of the American Convention (Articles 33,
62(1) and 20 and 65), its Statute (Article 30), and supported by a consistent monitoring
practice never challenged by States before. 9
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In practice, the Court sends written communications to States requesting
information on the measures adopted to implement the judgement. States submit
reports that are referred to petitioners and the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (hereinafter the'Commission') for their observations. As a result of this process,
the Court issues resolutions on compliance, which are published and available at the
Court's website. The supervision process is essentially in written form, although in
recent times the Court convened the parties and the Commission to private hearings
for compliance assessment.10 Moreover, pursuant to Article 65 of the American
Convention, the Court may submit to the General Assembly information on States
that demonstrate reluctance in complying with the Court's judgements." However, to
date, the General Assembly has limited itself to adopting resolutions urging States to
comply, in general, without taking any other steps to ensure full compliance.12
For a complete set of resolutions monitoring compliance with the Court's
judgements, please visit the Court's website at: www.corteidh.or.cr/supervision.cfm.

2.

THE KIMEL CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL DEFAMATION LAWS

In Kimel vs Argentina, the Court revisited the issue of using criminal defamation
laws to sanction adverse public criticism against public officials. In two former cases,
Herrera Ulloa vs Costa Rica and Canese vs Paraguay,13 the Court held that freedom
of speech merits a higher degree of protection when public officials, rather than
private individuals, are targets of alleged defamatory statements. The rationale for
the heighten protection is to foster public debate on accountability and transparency
of governmental actors in a democratic society. In the aforementioned cases, the
Court concluded that, within the context of the facts, the application of criminal
and other sanctions to the alleged defamers were disproportionate and resulted in
to
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violations of the right to freedom of expression protected under Article 13 of the
American Convention. In Kimel, the Court further scrutinised the criminalisation
of defamation and its compatibility with the Convention. This issue is particularly
relevant in Argentina. According to petitioners, although the State had derogated its
contempt laws (desacato),public officials continued to sue journalists under criminal
defamation laws. Arguably, the possibility of a criminal conviction lingering upon
journalists serves to deter public criticism of public officials.
Eduardo Gabriel Kimel (hereinafter 'Kimel') is a well-known journalist, writer, and
researcher, who published various books pertaining to Argentina's political history.
Among those publications, The San PatricioMassacre exposed the assassinations of
five priests in 1976, during the Argentine military dictatorship. The book provided
adverse remarks against State authorities, including an Argentine judge, who were
involved with the homicidal investigation. Kimel asserted that the investigating judge
completed all the formalities of the criminal investigation, but never intended to
establishthe truth. Moreover, Kimeldepicted the Argentinejudiciaryas condescending,
and in some occasions, even as accomplices to the military repression. On 28 October
1991, the investigating judge filed a criminal lawsuit against Kimel for defamation
14
(calumnias).
The Appellate Court found Kimel guilty and he received a one-year
suspended sentence and a USD 20,000 fine. The Argentine Supreme Court rejected
Kimel's appeal, thus, the case was presented to Commission.
In their submissions before the Court, the Commission and petitioner complained
that the State did not abide by its international obligations and violated Articles 13
(Freedom of Thought and Expression), 8 (Judicial Guarantees), and 25 (Judicial
Protection) of the American Convention. The violations were committed in relation
to the general obligations to respect and ensure, as well as to adopt domestic measures
protected by Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. On 9 October 2007, the State
and Kimel's representatives announced a friendly settlement agreement. Argentina
accepted international responsibility for the violations of the rights of freedom
of thought and expression, the right to be tried within a reasonable time and the
general obligations to respect and ensure, and to adopt domestic measures. It also
requested the Court to determine the appropriate reparations. Petitioners withdrew
their claim regarding the alleged violations of the rights to be tried by an impartial
tribunal, to appeal and to judicial protection. Notwithstanding the State acceptance
of responsibility, the Court decided that certain legal issues needed clarification; thus,
the Court proceeded to rule on the specific Convention violations.
The Court, at the onset ofthe proceedings, reiterated its former case-law contending
that the right to freedom of expression under the American Convention has an
individual and a social dimension. These dual dimensions require States to respect the
freedom to communicate ideas and ensure the collective right to receive information

1
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and views from others. Subsequently, the Court declared that the right to freedom of
expression is not an absolute right. Article 13 of the American Convention authorises
permissible restrictions to this right in order to balance other equally relevant rights,
such as the right to reputation protected under Article 11 of that treaty. The Court in
Kimel concluded that the determination of the permissibility of restrictions in this
case involves a four-prong test: 1) whether the interference - criminal liability - was
established by law; 2) whether the protection of a judge's reputation is a legitimate
aim; 3) whether the application of criminal law was necessary in the context of this
case; and 4) whether the measures adopted against Kimel were proportional to the
end the State sought to achieve.
First, the Court reasoned that the application of criminal law in restricting the right
to freedom of expression requires that the legislation respect the principle of legality.
The relevant law must define the breath of the prohibited conduct in express, precise,
and exhaustive terms. Furthermore, it must be adopted prior to its application to a
particular case. In Kimel, the State accepted that Argentine criminal defamation laws
were overbroad and lacked precision, thereby permitting inappropriate interferences
with the right to freedom of expression. The Court concluded that Argentine domestic
legislation on defamation violated Article 9 (freedom from ex postfacto laws) and 13
of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2.
Second, the Court held that protection of a judge's reputation is a legitimate aim under
Article 13 of the Convention. Paragraph two of that provision specifically authorizes
States to impose restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in order to protect the
'reputation of others'. Moreover, under Article 11 of the Convention, everyone, including
judges, has the right to honour and reputation. The use of criminal law to protect the
reputation of others is not per se unacceptable under the Convention; however, the
necessity and proportionality of its application must be assessed in each case.
Third, the Court assessed whether the criminal sanctions imposed upon Kimel were
necessary to protect the right ofthe judge's honour and reputation. The Commission and
the petitioners argued that the criminalisation of public criticism against State officials
is in all cases unnecessary, even if the comment is offensive and damaging. The optimal
mechanisms to ensure honour and reputation are the usage of civil sanctions coupled
with appropriate procedures that permits the exertion of the right to rectification
or reply. The Court disagreed and concluded that the use of criminal sanctions to
protect the reputation of others, even public officials, is not in itself incompatible
with the protection of freedom of speech. However, criminal measures can be applied
only in exceptional cases. The Court further suggested that for a criminal measure
to be justified, the following elements must be weighed: the extreme gravity of the
speaker's comments; the speaker's intention to defame; and the type of damage caused
to the plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in establishing whether
exceptional circumstances are met in their case. The Court further declared that
journalists have a duty to verify in a reasonable, not necessarily exhaustive, manner the
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facts on which they based their opinions. It is appropriate to require from journalists
equity and diligence in the process of verifying the information provided by sources,
particularly by comparing the information to other available relevant facts. The Court
concluded that the facts clearly showed that the application of criminal sanctions to
Kimel was unnecessary. Moreover, the State accepted the existence of shortcomings in
its domestic legislation when acknowledging international responsibility.
Last, the Court weighed the proportionality of the criminal measures imposed
on Kimel against the protection of the judge's reputation. It concluded that this test
required the Court to assess: 1) the degree of interference with the rights at stake
and whether that interference was severe, intermediate, or moderate; 2) the relevance
of protecting the opposing right; and 3) whether the protection of one right justifies
imposing restrictions on the other affected right. Depending on the facts of each case,
freedom of expression will prevail in some cases and honour and reputation will
prevail in others. In regards to freedom of expression, the interference with Kimel's
right to express his views was severe since he was criminally convicted and received a
stiff fine. In regards to honour and reputation, freedom of speech enjoys a higher level
of protection to foster debates and accountability where public officials' (or prospective
public officials') qualifications or actions in pursuance of the State position are at the
centre of the discussion. In democratic societies, intense overt scrutiny is part of the
sphere of public debate. Therefore, public officials are, in essence, choosing to expose
themselves to public criticism when they decide to leave the private sphere. Moreover,
in the sphere of public debate even offensive, shocking and irritating comments are
afforded a broader protection than merely private speech.
In Kimel, the public criticism referred to a matter of public notoriety, namely
the investigation carried out by a judge on a massacre perpetrated by state officials
during the military dictatorship in Argentina. Additionally, Kimel did not use abusive
language and referred only to the judge's role in investigating the case - not to the
judge's personal life. Moreover, Kimel thoroughly researched the judicial investigation
of the massacre and offered a value judgement on the judicial power's role during the
dictatorship. The Court reasoned that Kimel's opinions, since it cannot be considered
truthful or false, did not necessitate proof, because only facts merit proof. Proving the
truth of value judgements is impossible, therefore, according to the Court subjecting
individuals to criminal sanctions for expressing these judgements is not proportionate
to the aim of protecting the reputation of others. In sum, Argentina violated Article 13
of the American Convention. Noteworthy, is that in the Kimel Case the Court, for the
first time, followed the 'value judgements' approach more extensively developed by
other international tribunals, notably the European Court of Human Rights.
Upon acceptance of the State's responsibility, the Court also found that the
extensive domestic proceedings in Kimel's case failed to ensure the petitioner the
right to a hearing within a reasonable time, as protected under Article 8(1) of the
Convention.
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The Court required that Argentina grants Kimel USD 30,000 for total damages.
The Court also ordered that the domestic decision convicting Kimel for defamation
be left without effect and his name removed from the criminal records. Moreover, to
restore Kimel's reputation the State must publish sections of the Court's judgement
in the official gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation and hold a public act
acknowledging international responsibility for the violation of his rights. Last, the
Court orders the State to adjust its domestic legislation on defamation in light of the
protections afforded by the American Convention.
As a final comment, it is worth noting that the Court's conclusion on the application
of criminal sanctions is not in agreement with the Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression, adopted by the Commission and its Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression in 2000.15 Principle 10 of the Declaration declares that
[t]he protection of a person's reputation should only be guaranteed through civil sanctions
in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public person or a private
person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public interest.
Notwithstanding this different approach, the Court, as stated above, made clear that
criminal sanctions are permitted only under a very limited set of circumstances.
Moreover, the two separate opinions, appended to the decision, appear to suggest that
the Court's decision was a result of a compromise that will require further elaboration
and clarification in the future.

3.

THE NEPTUNE CASE: THE COURT'S FIRST CASE
AGAINST HAITI

Haiti ratified the American Convention on 27 September 1977 and accepted the
Court's contentious jurisdiction on 20 March 1998. The Neptune Case is the first case
litigated against Haiti before the Court. The Commission alleged that this was an
emblematic case to redress the victim's human rights violations and to draw general
attention to the suffering of many other Haitian detainees.
The facts in this case transpired during a period of political polarisation, public
insecurity, and inadequate institutionalisation, heightened among other factors, by
the crisis regarding the local and legislative elections of 21 May 2000. Yvon Neptune
(hereinafter 'Neptune'), during these elections, was elected as Senator of Haiti. The
political crisis escalated due to the lack of consensus regarding the irregular polls,
which were denounced by the opposing party and the international community.
In March 2002, Neptune renounced his position as Senator and was appointed as
15
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Haiti's Prime Minister. In the following months, there were numerous acts of political
violence, protests, and repressions throughout the country. Protestors demanded the
resignation of the former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and sectors of the Haitian
National Police. In February of 2004, an armed conflict developed in the northern city
of Gonalves, which propagated to other cities. It is in the city of Saint-Marc, located
south of Gonaives, where Neptune is alleged to have ordered the Haitian police to
terminate the opposition; thus, initiating the social repression and the massacres that
resulted thereof. 16
On 29 February 2004, the United States Government assisted the former President
Aristide by transporting him to the Central African Republic. Subsequently, an
interim government was emplaced, which abrogated Neptune's term of office as Prime
Minister. Neptune, soon after, went into hiding due to death-threats from adversaries.
Furthermore, the Saint-Marc Trial Court announced an order for his arrest in issuance
of the initiation and participation of the Saint-Marc massacres and arson. On 27 June
2004, Neptune surrendered himself to the authorities and was arrested.
The Trial Court concluded the initial criminal investigation and ordered that
Neptune be tried as an accomplice for the perpetration of the Saint-Marc massacre,
among other allegations. This resolution was appealed to the Gonalves Appellate
Court, which concluded that, given the status of Neptune as a Prime Minister, ordinary
courts had no jurisdiction over the charges. In addition to its lack of jurisdiction, the
Appellate Court failed in notifying Neptune, through a written form, of its decision.
The Haitian High Court of Justice was the only court that had jurisdiction over
Neptune's case, but the High Court never reviewed the charges. Though established
in the Constitution, the High Court of Justice is not yet a functioning institution. On
27 July 2006, Neptune was released from prison for humanitarian reasons. However,
his criminal charges remained opened.
The Court emphasises that its role is to review the general obligations of the
State under the Convention and not to condemn individuals for criminal violations.
Therefore, whether Neptune is guilty of the Saint-Marc allegation is not a relevant
issue for the Court to decide. The issue before the Court is whether the State
violated Neptune's due process and human rights while under investigation and
incarceration.
The Court found that Neptune's right to be tried by a competent court protected
under Article 8(1) of the Convention was violated. The trial and subsequent detention
of the petitioner by a court that was later declared without jurisdiction, coupled with
the inexistence of the High Court, left the petitioner in an indefinite legal status
with indefinite pending criminal charges. The Court held that the case's lack of final
determination within a reasonable time resulted in the violation of Neptune's right to
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judicial protection mandated under Article 25 of the Convention. The Court further
held the Haitian judicial system as insecure, inefficient, and incompetent.
In addition, the Court found that Neptune's detention violated his right to personal
liberty under Article 7 of the Convention on several grounds. First, the Court reasoned
that the detention was arbitrary as it resulted from a criminal trial conducted by a
court that lacked jurisdiction. Second, the Court held that petitioner was not informed
of the charges pending against him within a reasonable time. Neptune was only made
aware of those charges when the trial court concluded the initial investigations and
referred the case for trial 14 months after his incarceration. Third, the Court found
that Neptune was never brought before a court to review the legality of his detention.
He was released two years after his arrest without a decision analysing that matter.
The charges, to date, are still pending against Neptune and he remains vulnerable
to incarceration at any time. In sum, the Court concluded that Neptune's detention
violated Articles 7(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Convention.
Evidence further exhibited that Neptune was denied humane treatment while
in prison. The penitentiary lacked security; was overcrowded; lacked beds; lacked
ventilation; had scarce hygienic facilities; scarce potable water; lack of medical
attention; grave sanitary risks; and a deficient diet. Neptune frequently feared for his
life. He received several death-threats, was beaten, and was the object of attempted
murder while incarcerated. Neptune, although in an isolated cell, was never segregated
from other common convicted criminals. The guards also insulted and threatened
him. For these events, among others, the Court held that Neptune's condition while
detained constituted inhumane treatment. Thus, the Court concluded that the State
violated Articles 5(1), (2) and (4), in connection to Article 1(1) of the Convention.
The Court mandated the State to compensate Neptune for the infringement of his
rights and required that judicial measures are adopted to finalise the criminal charges
against him. The Court concluded that if the State decides to subject Neptune to
another legal proceeding, then it must be done in accordance with the constitution, due
process, and other judicial guarantees. Furthermore, the State must adopt legislation
and all other judicial requisites to regulate Supreme Court procedures and ensure
competency in the system. Moreover, the Court ordered the publication of parts of its
judgement in the official gazette and another publication of national distribution. Last,
it mandated the State to adopt a plan of action to substantially improve the conditions
of Haitian prisons within a two-year period. Notably, the reparations afforded in this
case extended beyond the individual victim and intended to force the State to take
action on a number of issues, such as the inexistence of a functioning judiciary or
inhumane prison conditions affecting the general Haitian prison population.
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